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**OLEKSANDER PALTOV,
DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
IN THE UKRAINIAN STATE (1918)**

Oleksander Oleksandrovich Paltov (1867–?) is an unordinary and somewhat enigmatic person in the history of the Ukrainian state. He played a considerable role in high places of the Ukrainian State mostly behind the scenes and produced the most pronounced influence on Hetman almost to the end of his rule. Memoirs of virtually each important public official related to 1918 include to some extent — greater or less — reference to O. Paltov. Notwithstanding all political twists and turns of 1918 Hetmanate, Oleksander Oleksandrovich always kept hidden behind the screen of the public policy preferring to act in the depth at its hidden engines, which explains why he has remained ‘undiscovered’ by politicians who purport to be historians and by historians who purport to be politicians. So who in fact was this ethnic Russian who, in Hetman’s words, “was genuinely and wholeheartedly concerned about creating Ukraine”¹?

Unfortunately, neither national nor foreign historiography can boast of any studies or researches into O. Paltov’s life. He was born 1867 in Saint-Petersburg in the old noble family. His father and uncle were famous officers of the Guard and one of his uncles was the commander of the Emperor’s yacht. In 1887, O. Paltov graduated cum laude the law department of the Saint-Petersburg University and was left there to pursue post-graduate studies. Later, as a young professor adjunct he gave lectures in Kazan University, before being invited to Petersburg for position of the secretary in the Ministry of Communications². It is also known that in 1900 he served as a vice-director in one of the departments of the Russian Ministry of Roads³ and then as a head of chancellery with



Paltov family coat of arms

the Minister of Roads, S.Yu. Vitte. For some time, before S. Vitte was appointed as the Russian prime-minister he was his secretary.

At the same time, due to high influence and status of his family (or rather the family of his wife, daughter of the Emperor's palace administrator), he was introduced into the Emperor's court and was awarded the courtier title of the Russian Tsar's Groom of the Chamber. O. Paltov was married to Olga Konstantinovna Kolzakova, and had daughter Ksenia (graduated from Smolny Institute with personal Empress award) and son Mihailo. According to some sources, his daughter married one of the American millionaire H. Ford's sons⁴.

When the railroad district committees have been established under the Ministry of Roads the young O. Paltov was dispatched to Warsaw as a head of the district committee. It did not prevent him though from frequently visiting Petersburg. In his recollections, one of Paltov's close comrades of those times B. Steletskiy described O. Paltov as a highly educated and well-mannered person who spoke several languages and "loved so much the bright, hilarious life"⁵. For such tone of life in the Empire capital the wage of the committee head was too frugal. Daring not (and being ashamed of) counting on the fortune of his wife's parents O. Paltov did not hesitate to take random side jobs.

Shortly, O. Paltov found himself entangled in a criminal case and was accused of accepting a 30 thousand rubles bribe for a promise to help a candidate firm in obtaining rights to deliver its goods by the Ural railroads. The scheme was quite skillful. At that time Russia was constructing new railroads at fast (even headlong) pace. This led to severe competition and enormous demand for experts in drafting business notes (a sort of business plans) for new railroad projects. This was the reason why the O. Paltov's acquaintances who had been the candidates under one of the concession tenders allegedly asked him to help them out in compiling a business note for their proposal in exchange for hefty 10 thousand rubles. O. Paltov agreed and shortly the proposal was announced successful⁶.

But hardly the decision on tender outcome has been taken one of the competitors (whose proposal was rejected) came up with a claim that their rival "has won concession by corrupting the [Railroad] Minister's administrator who pulled the strings to get the needed proposal approved"⁷. The claim referred to O. Paltov and the

On photograph: Ukrainian diplomatic mission in Berlin: O. Paltov, V. Kochubei, F. Lizogub (August 1918)



amount of 30 thousand rubles. As it always happens in such circumstances the rumors first spread among the ladies and then made their way to the Ministry. Later on, when O.Paltov has already been transferred to Warsaw the investigation was launched. It turned out that the money was shown in the firm's internal reports and the payment was recoded in the master ledger, but the state auditor found it doubtful from legal perspective and initiated the criminal proceedings which were directed against O.Paltov and not against the firm. Since the accused held high position in court this affair attracted a lot of attention and notwithstanding intercession by top officials in the Ministry of Roads O.Paltov soon had to make depositions. As a result, he was temporarily stripped of his courtier title and had to send in his resignation. Finally it was the Emperor Nicolas the First who intervened and ordered to have this issue postponed until the end of the world war that has just begun. In spite of all these events, O.Paltov kept his position in the Ministry of Roads where he was listed as the chancellery director. Apparently he managed to walk away scot-free from this affair not only because of having high positioned friends in the Tsar Court and in the Ministry but also because of being a mason, in Paris lodge⁸. Throughout the world war O.Paltov remained to be a suspect in an open criminal case. The Emperor's decision about deferral of formal proceedings on this matter was taken in reply to multiple requests already after O.Paltov has been enrolled by the newly appointed Head of Galicia-Bukovina railroads K.SC.Nemshaiev⁹. During the Russian occupation of the western Ukraine up till February Revolution in Russia O.Paltov has been working as a legal advisor at Galicia-Bukovina railroads directorate¹⁰.

After 1917 revolutionary events in Petrograd O.Paltov ended up in Kyiv where he got to know the administrator of the South-

Western Railroads B. Butenko. His steep climb on career ladder in Ukraine began after meeting with P. Skoropadskiy on the eve of coup d'état which the former commander of the 1st Ukrainian Corps and otaman of Free Cossacks has been staging along with "Ukrainian National Community". According to the general's memoirs, O. Paltov was introduced to him on 25 April 1918 by the member of his organization M. Gizhitskiy, to whom P. Skoropadskiy once mentioned that he wanted to issue a public appeal and needed a qualified lawyer who would prepare a good draft¹¹. It was M. Gizhitskiy who introduced O. Paltov to the head of the Ukrainian National Community. The chief of the Hetman's General Staff claims however that O. Paltov met with P. Skoropadskiy only through mediation of B. Butenko, another member of the UNC and the future minister of roads in Hetman government¹². In fact these two statements hardly contradict. Apparently it was B. Butenko who introduced O. Paltov into the secret organization where he could make acquaintance with P. Skoropadskiy, but the future Hetman, as is frequently the case, remembered the lawyer O. Paltov only by their more important meeting arranged by M. Gizhitskiy that led to the joint work on the first draft of constitutional documents.

P. Skoropadskiy went with his new acquaintance in a separate room where he told him about his agenda and objectives that he aspired to achieve after establishment of Hetmanate. He laid down for O. Paltov main ideas that he wanted to express in his appeal. Olexander Olexandrovich made some notes and went home. As Hetman later recollected, one and half hour later O. Paltov returned with an almost finished text of the future "Charter". All it needed was some small editorial changes and adjustments. The future Hetman was struck by "this clarity of mind and agility when working over such a complex issue". Quite impressed, P. Skoropadskiy started thinking about appointing his new aid as a counselor and deputy state secretary of the future Hetman state, working with him side by side¹³. O. Paltov became a personal counselor to P. Skoropadskiy and kept this position right through to the downfall of Hetmanate.

Over these years, he has drafted not only the Hetman's "Charter to entire Ukrainian people" but also "Laws on temporary state structure of Ukraine" that were published in Kyiv after upheaval and proclamation of the Ukraine State on 29 April 1918. Initially, O. Paltov prepared the proclamation of the Ukrainian

In picture: Official visit paid by Hetman P. Skoropadskiy to Germany (September 1918). Hetman P. Skoropadskiy, Ambassador of Ukrainian State to Germany Baron von Stengel, the Ukrainian State Deputy Minister of foreign affairs O. Paltov



State as Principality of Kyiv and Kingdom of Galicia¹⁴. His chief, P. Skoropadskiy however was strongly opposed to any attempts of absolutizing Hetman's authority. He believed that his dictatorship had to be temporary, pending stabilization of political and economic situation in the country, after which the democratically elected Soym (parliament) would determine the structure of the Ukrainian State and its government. O. Paltov nonetheless stuck

to his creed and, being a convinced monarchist, remained stalwart supporter of monarchy even after institution of Hetmanate. Over the entire existence of Ukrainian State he kept hoping that it would be transformed eventually into one or another form of monarchy.

After coup d'état O. Paltov was promoted to the state counselor with the Hetman's Cabinet of Ministers, the P. Skoropadskiy's envoy and de-facto head of his chancellery¹⁵. In May 1918, he was appointed a deputy minister of foreign affairs (simultaneously reporting to Hetman) and kept public offices till November. When the Hetman government was formed, the Ministry of foreign affairs was at its initial stage. In fact it had to be set up from scratch by enrolling new employees for national departments and staff for the Ukrainian foreign representative offices¹⁶.

According to Director of the Hetman Ukrainian Telegraph Agency (UTA) D. Dontsov, O. Paltov was a typical sample of the "south-western region" who spoke Russian, Polish, German and mediocre Ukrainian. Since the first days of the Ukrainian State and Hetman government his weight in political unofficial and official circles has been enormous, mostly due to his high station and influence on P. Skoropadskiy. At the same time this jovial and boisterous man with rotund face and "tsvikerk" (pinch-nose) on top of his nose had miraculously huge energy. Describing his impressions,

D. Dontsov wrote in his journal on 29 May 1918: “Paltov would do everything: set up press bureaus, appoint eparchs, conceive new regulations for the army. At the same time he is constantly negotiating with the Germans”¹⁷. The last sentence speaks of his clear-cut pro-German orientation that sometimes went far beyond the boundaries of ordinary diplomacy. “When the telephone rings in the antechamber over the staircase housing the office of Kryga and Kochubey, Hetman aids-de-camp, very often the person they want to talk to is “His Excellency von Paltoff”, – wrote D. Dontsov already a month after Hetman revolt; in his words, P. Skoropadskiy’s counselor was a sort of barometer to measure Central Powers’ military and political position¹⁸. The other government official, N. Surovtseva who was a socialist revolutionary hostile to the very existence of Hetmanate as a whole and its proponents in particular had nonetheless to admit that “Paltov was a hardened politician who had an experience of revolving “in high places” (unlike other Ukrainian officials with predominantly educational background)”¹⁹.

P. Skoropadskiy’s confidence in his counselor was limitless although he had to admit of quite often having certain troubles because of O. Paltov. The chief of state was informed that his counselor and the deputy minister of foreign affairs had had financial misunderstandings with the former authorities and that he had even been prosecuted. Hetman insisted on concrete evidence which under those conditions was quite naturally unavailable. Besides, P. Skoropadskiy saw that O. Paltov had no considerable savings and, no matter what Paltov’s adversaries contended, was “positive that over the times of Hetman he had not been detected of doing any disgraceful things”²⁰. Even in emigration P. Skoropadskiy repeatedly stated that O. Paltov had been “a person with outstanding intellectual capacities and comprehensive education, highly industrious, even-minded, always on workplace and devoted to the cause”²¹. And this cause was also his own, remarked the former Hetman.

It was O. Paltov (or the Hetman’s chief of General Staff) who would usually be the first to come into P. Skoropadskiy’s bedroom for the eight or nine o’clock report to the chief of state²². The range of this person’s activities who seemed to be ubiquitous appeared to be limitless. His working hours would extend to one o’clock in the morning when he sat at Council of Minister’s sessions, only to show up at Hetman’s at eight o’clock the next day with a pile of complet-

ed papers²³. It did not prevent O. Paltov though from occasionally “painting the town red”, which was not left unnoticed by Hetman who wondered how come his subordinate had been managing to get all his work duly done. However what P. Skoropadskiy was interested in first of all was the person’s business qualities and not his purported adventures. And O. Paltov had no shortage of such business qualities. He “would broach subjects always broadly and boldly; would not try to mince it and would not be afraid of new approaches if saw that they were reasonable. He had a wide vision which unfortunately most of our ministers have been lacking, — wrote later Hetman”²⁴.

In his description of O. Paltov’s personal qualities and position in Hetman’s government the Chief of the Hetman’s General Staff went even further: “For Skoropadskiy Paltov was a gold mine. It was virtually impossible for him to find any other administrator who could compare with Paltov. The Paltov’s influence on Skoropadskiy was boundless; no single important paper would be signed by Skoropadskiy without his previous consultations with Paltov. All relations with the Germans have been closely supervised by Paltov who acted on Hetman’s behalf. It was Paltov who secretly managed all Cabinet of Ministers doings. Generally speaking all Skoropadskiy’s rational life and actions was sublimed in Paltov.

In political sense Paltov could be referred to the category of non-partisan or all-partisan politicians. He spoke with equal success with Ukrainians, supporting their political views, agree with Cadets and monarchists; and the same time he always managed to turn the topic of debates in such a way that the others were forced to embrace his point of view.

Although his official position was the deputy minister of foreign affairs he would work directly with Hetman going sometimes in the finest minutiae of his personal life such as what to include in lunch menus, what to say in toasts, what guests to invite etc.

Skoropadskiy knew that Paltov had been formally accused but also he was aware of not being able to dispense with Paltov’s services”²⁵.

Speaking about the Ministry of foreign affairs and its chief, P. Skoropadskiy even after downfall of his regime did not consider D. Doroshenko a person who deserved to sit in the minister’s seat. Regretting that he could not replace Doroshenko with anybody else Hetman was consoled by the fact that his deputy was O. Paltov.

The Ministry staff and government officials were quick to notice that the actual head of the foreign ministry in Ukraine was not Dmitro Ivanovich but Olexander Olexandrovich. In particular, the MFA employee N. Surovtseva wrote: "He (Doroshenko) imagined that Paltov helped him in his work by modestly keeping his distance. But I and not only I but all who worked in the ministry were of a quite different opinion: it was Paltov who did the management and Doroshenko very modestly kept his distance"²⁶. She also admitted that "he (Paltov. — *P.G.-N.*) would spend most of the time at Hetman's and from there administer the Ministry's political course and its resources"²⁷. This statement was also supported by P. Skoropadskiy who recollected later that "for almost entire duration of the Hetmanate the foreign policy was orchestrated by myself (Skoropadskiy — *P.G.-N.*), Paltov and partially Lizogub"²⁸.

This is also corroborated by the actual chain of events. O. Paltov was in the epicenter of the foreign policy conducted by the Ukrainian government. He was included in the Ukrainian State delegation to 1918 negotiations with the Great Don Cossack Army. Also, along with Hetman, representatives of the German, Austrian-Hungarian and Ukrainian military command and diplomats he participated in a 26 August 1918 parade of newly created Ukrainian Volodimir-Volyn "bluecoats" division recruited from the former Ukrainian POWs in the Russian army²⁹. O. Paltov enthusiastically greeted V. Lipinskiy's idea of creating an alliance between Ukraine, Germany, Poland and Hungary³⁰. After the Russian-German peace treaty he suggested Ukrainian diplomacy to pay closer attention to Baltic states and to open a consulate office in Vilna (now Vilnius) since "this region lying at crossroads of Warsaw, Moscow and Kyiv interests is important for both economic and political life of Ukraine"³¹.

The special role played by O. Paltov in P. Skoropadskiy's government was emphasized also by the former chief of the General Staff B. Steletskiy, according to whose recollections Hetman "would not take a single step without taking counsel with Paltov" who, in his words, maintained his clout mostly "through hard work and undoubtedly astute acumen"³². Suffice it to say that even appointment of I. Kistiakivskiy as the Minister of Internal Affairs and S. Gerbel as the head of the Council of Ministers was taken by P. Skoropadskiy only after O. Paltov's approval. It was O. Paltov who convinced P. Skoropadskiy to favor the state secre-

tary I. Kistiakivskiy among other candidates (former tsar governors who knew more or less the intricacies of complex administrative apparatus) to position of the deputy minister and then as the minister of internal affairs³³. In the same vein, S. Gerbel who had not been particularly valued neither by the German command nor by Hetman was appointed by P. Skoropadskiy as the head of the Ukrainian State government only at O. Paltov's say-so³⁴.

At the same time he and the Hetman's chief of the General Staff B. Steletskiy, according to the latter, opposed the general scrivener I. Poltavets-Ostrianitsa and foreign minister D. Doroshenko and "did their best [to] smooth out ... relations [with Russia] and make them in the common Russian policies not so harmful". If they felt their arguments falling on dead ears they would invite to the meeting Hetman's wife "who would show up as if on the spur of the moment and being a quite clever woman devised ways of reconciling the opposite parties and persuading her husband"³⁵.

On 17 August 1918, jointly with F. Lizogub, head of the Council of Ministers, O. Paltov left for Germany (accompanied by secretary, prince V. Kochubei), where he held in Berlin a number of meetings and talks on economic, commercial and political issues with the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs von Hintze. These negotiations also touched on ratification of the Brest treaty, Kholmshk, Don, Crimea and Bessarabia problems as well as some issues of financial and economic nature. Some progress was made also in a sensitive issue of national army and fleet. All in all, this visit was quite successful for Ukraine.

However, F. Lizogub and O. Paltov could not achieve the final solution of creating the Ukrainian army and transferring by the Germans the Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine. To this effect, at the invitation of the German Kaiser Wilhelm II P. Skoropadskiy went to Berlin on 3 September 1918. Among other members the Ukrainian state delegation comprised also O. Paltov. On 4th September the special Ukrainian State train arrived to the German capital where the high Ukrainian delegation stayed at Adlon hotel. Along with Hetman and the Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany baron von Stengel, O. Paltov visited 5 September 1918 the German Reichskanzler (Chancellor) Count Georg von Hertling and the deputy state secretary von Busche. In the evening of the same day Reichskanzler had an official lunch with the Ukrainian delegation

followed by reception attended by diplomatic corps, ministers and high military and civil officials.

On the same evening, 5 September 1918, the official Ukrainian delegation set off for the Wilhelmshöhe castle 6 kilometers from Kassel where it was awaited by Wilhelm II. After the first meeting took place between Hetman and Emperor when P. Skoropadskiy was awarded the Grand Order of the Red Eagle*. Wilhelm II invited O. Paltov and Hetman delegates to his cabinet. They were also awarded with German decorations³⁶. During breakfast O. Paltov and G. Zelenevskiy sat in front of the Emperor and Hetman in front of the German Kaiser. Interestingly, after the breakfast and general talk with P. Skoropadskiy the Emperor stepped aside with his aide-de-camp and Berhem to exchange notes with O. Paltov³⁷, the fact that also speaks volumes about weight he enjoyed in the Hetman's establishment.

The high confidence of Hetman to his counselor is also corroborated by the fact that P. Skoropadskiy decided not to take O. Paltov

* The Order was founded by the King of Prussia Frederick William II (Friedrich Wilhelm II, 1744–1797). The motto of this Order was *Cincere et Constante* which can be translated as either "sincere and faithful" or "faithful and persistent". For a certain period of time, the order was the highest decoration in this country. It reproduced a red eagle with spread wings. On its chest eagle wore the white-and-black shield (small coat of arms of the House of Hohenzollern). The order had six grades: Grand, worn on the sash by order patrons; I class, the ribbon with the order cross on a sling and star on the left part of the chest; II class, the cross on the neck and star on the left part of the chest; III class, the cross on the sling worn on the left part of the chest; IV class, the cross on the sling worn on the left part of the chest. Medal on the sling worn on the left part of the chest. The order ribbon was of white color with two bright yellow strips on both sides. In some cases though the order was worn on the German Cross sash and black ribbon with three white strips. The latter version was conferred to those who already had three military crosses. The option without swords was awarded to state and public officials. For example, the 3rd class order cross could be conferred for 50 (sic!) years of uninterrupted and irreproachable service to Kaiser. The common practice dating back to the times of Friedrich II was to confer the swords for military merits only. There were also "additions" in form of a separate pair of swords, crown and oak leaf which were conferred for military merits and for multiple awards of same decoration. There was also a variant of the order in form of a laced star that was conferred to non-Christians. Likewise in Russia there was a variant of the Saint-George order that was conferred "to unbelievers".

The most important trait of the order was its restriction within a "club". Unlike other orders enrollment to which was only an award for merits of civil and military nature, the Red Eagle order was conferred to individuals who would exercise influence in high policy and other aspects of the German state. Even after many years after its termination the order remained the symbol of a special status enjoyed by its recipient. The order cavaliers included top level German and Austrian generals, ministers and marshals such as P. Hindenburg and E. Ludendorff.

on his trip to Kiel, Cologne and visit to the Krupp mills but left him instead in Berlin to boost up progress in solving a number of critical issues such as Crimea, familiarizing himself with internal situation in Germany and, in this context, getting more information about leaders of socialist partiers who sat in Reichstag, the German parliament³⁸. In P. Skoropadskiy's opinion, O. Paltov has "failed" this task apparently underestimating the importance that social democratic partiers had in the Germany of that time.

In November 1918, as the world war came to its breaking point and the Quadruple Alliance defeat was imminent (Bulgaria has capitulated and Austria-Hungary has underwent the process of revolutions and the empire break-down) O. Paltov revealed his Russophile positions rather ostensibly. At the same time under conditions of the internal crisis when P. Skoropadskiy had to face the dilemma of either allowing or rejecting convention of the National Congress initiated by the opposition Ukrainian National Union (scheduled for 17 November 1918), O. Paltov advocated against its interdiction. On the contrary, he supported the idea that Hetman had to forestall this move of socialist opposition and convene the Congress himself by changing the composition of its delegates in favor of the non-socialist partiers. The Hetman's counselor considered this to be a reasonable although a risky step and P. Skoropadskiy, according to his memoirs, could in this way interfere with all plots hatched by V. Vinnichenko and Co and retain the power even if "beaten up a little"³⁹. As we know the decision he took was totally different and the overall political course of the state ship underwent critical changes.

On 13 November 1918, P. Skoropadskiy dissolved the F. Lizogub's Cabinet of Ministers and jointly with O. Paltov drafted the new message to the Ukrainian people where the main thesis was to accept the need of adopting the path of rapprochement with non-Bolshevik Russia on federal basis. On 14 November 1918, Hetman declared the Charter of federation with future non-Bolshevik Russia. On the same day he instructed S. Gerbel to establish the new Council of Ministers, free of Germanophiles and independists. In D. Doroshenko's words, the state had to undergo pivotal changes considering recent international events and in beginning of November Hetman discharged O. Paltov who was a reputed Germanophile from the office of deputy minister of foreign affairs⁴⁰. According to the archive documents O. Paltov himself sent in his

resignation from position of deputy minister of foreign affairs, acting state secretary and all other only on 20 November 1918, not in beginning of the month⁴¹. Shortly after that, on 14 December 1918, P. Skoropadskiy resigned as chief of state. Later, already in emigration, in his recollections about O. Paltov he wrote: “He was genuinely and wholeheartedly concerned about creating Ukraine. [...] I valued him from the very first day and will never change my high opinion about him although there are many of those who would probably blame me for this. As an answer to these critics I can say one thing: if you gentlemen find yourself one day in conditions that I had to go through I would advise you in good faith: take care of all who are clever, educated and laborious for they are few and far between”⁴².

The records about subsequent fate of O. Paltov are quite vague. It is known that in emigration he was quite active in Serbia where he entered the Belgrade Foreign Committee, whose members included prince Gagarin, the former state secretary under Hetmanate M. Gizhitskiy, count O. Bobrinskiy and others and which was purely Russophile and pro-German⁴³. The whirlpool of revolution and civil war has muddled and sometimes completely erased traces of many famous and less famous countrymen. On the other hand, nothing vanishes entirely and the figure of Olexander Paltov, as well as other actors of those turbulent times still awaits its researcher and biographer.

¹ *P. Skoropadskiy. Memoirs.* — Kyiv; Philadelphia, 1995. — page 150.

² TSDAVO [central archive] of Ukraine. — F. 4547. — Op. 1. — case 1. — pages 83–84.

³ RGIA (Russian state archive). — F. 229. — Op. 18. — case 229. — pages 1–12, year 1903.

⁴ *O. Platonov. Secret history of masonry* // [electronic resource] access code: <http://www.rus-sky.com/history/library/plat1-g.htm>.

⁵ TSDAVO of Ukraine. — F. 4547. — Op. 1. — case 1. — page 84.

⁶ *Idem.* — page 85.

⁷ *Idem.*

⁸ *N. Svitkov. Masonry in Russian emigration.* — seint-paolo São Paulo, 1966.

⁹ TSDAVO of Ukraine. — F. 4547. — Op. 1. — case 1. — page 85.

¹⁰ *D. Doroshenko History of Ukraine: 1917–1923* — v. 2. — page 47.

¹¹ *P. Skoropadskiy. Memoirs.* — page 149.

¹² TSDAVO of Ukraine. — F. 4547. — Op. 1. — case 1. — page 86.

¹³ *P. Skoropadskiy. Memoirs.* — page 149.

¹⁴ TSDAVO of Ukraine. — F. 1064. — Op. 2. — case 1. — page 167.

¹⁵ *D. Dontsov Year 1918, Kyiv.* — K.: Tempora, 2002. — page 190.

- ¹⁶ *D. Doroshenko* see title above. — page 103.
- ¹⁷ *D. Dontsov* see title above. — page 41.
- ¹⁸ *Idem.*
- ¹⁹ Life of Nadia Surovtseva described by herself... // Science and culture. Ukraine. — K., 1990. — page 467.
- ²⁰ *P. Skoropadskiy. Memoirs.* — page 150.
- ²¹ *Idem.*
- ²² *Idem.* — page 174.
- ²³ *Idem.* — page 150.
- ²⁴ *Idem.*
- ²⁵ TSDAVO of Ukraine. — F. 4547. — Op. 1. — case 1. — pages 86–88.
- ²⁶ Ж Life of Nadia Surovtseva described by herself..... — page 467.
- ²⁷ *Idem.*
- ²⁸ *P. Skoropadskiy. Memoirs.* — page 169.
- ²⁹ *D. Dontsov* see title above. — page 133.
- ³⁰ *D. Dontsov* see title above. — page 84.
- ³¹ TSDAVO of Ukraine. — F. 3766. — Op. 1. — case 68. — page 47.
- ³² *Idem.* — F. 4547. — Op. 1. — case 1. — page 61.
- ³³ *Idem.* — case 2. — pages 16–17.
- ³⁴ *Idem.* — page 128.
- ³⁵ *Idem.* — case 1. — pages 135–136.
- ³⁶ *Doroshenko case* see title above. — page 264.
- ³⁷ *P. Skoropadskiy. Memoirs.* — page 276.
- ³⁸ *Idem.* — page 280.
- ³⁹ *Idem.* — page 303.
- ⁴⁰ *D. Doroshenko* see title above. — page 285.
- ⁴¹ TSDAVO of Ukraine. — F. 1064. — Op. 1. — case 35. — page 203.
- ⁴² *P. Skoropadskiy. Memoirs.* — page 150.
- ⁴³ Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie. — case 23 XXIV-4a (11). — No 87286. — page 26.

